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Abstract
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting predicts impatience over short-run tradeoﬀs.
I present a direct non-laboratory test of this implication using data on the
nutritional intake of food stamp recipients. Caloric intake declines by 10 to
15 percent over the food stamp month, implying a signiﬁcant preference for
immediate consumption. These ﬁndings constitute a rejection of the permanent
income hypothesis and are extremely diﬃcult to reconcile with exponential
discounting. The data support an explanation based on time preference and
reject several alternative explanations, including highly elastic intertemporal
substitution. I explore implications for the optimal timing of transfer payments
under alternative assumptions about preferences.
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1Consider a consumer who is indiﬀerent between enjoying one additional dollar
of consumption today and 99.6 additional cents of consumption tomorrow. Such an
individual has a daily discount factor of 0.996, and if she is an exponential discounter
her annual discount factor will be about 0.23 (corresponding to an annual discount
rate of about 146 percent). She would therefore strictly prefer 24 dollars of additional
consumption today to 100 dollars of additional consumption one year from now, and
would happily accept seven cents today in exchange for 100 dollars in ﬁve years.
As these calculations illustrate, an exponential discounter who is reasonably pa-
tient in the long-run must be almost perfectly patient in the short-run. Even small
amounts of daily discounting translate into enormous amounts of annual discounting
in the exponential model. By contrast, the quasi-hyperbolic model of discounting
(Laibson, 1997) severs the link between short- and long-run time preference, and
predicts signiﬁcant present-bias even in short-run trade-oﬀs.
In this paper, I test for the presence of short-run impatience using data on the
caloric intake of food stamp recipients. I ﬁnd that the average caloric intake of mem-
bers of recipient households declines by 10 to 15 percent over the food stamp month.
A calibration exercise shows that, to be resolved with exponential discounting, these
facts require an annual discount factor of 0.23 (or an elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution of 6.7). Survey evidence on household ﬁnancial circumstances reveals rising
desperation over the course of the food stamp month, which suggests that a high elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution is not a likely explanation. Additionally, house-
holds with more short-run impatience (as estimated from hypothetical intertemporal
choices) are more likely to run out of food sometime during the month, consistent
with an explanation based on time preference.
The data can reject a number of alternative hypotheses. Households that shop
for food more frequently do not display a smaller decline in intake over the month,
casting doubt on explanations based on the depreciation of the household’s food
2stock. Data on household composition and inter-household transfers of food indicate
that the observed decline is not the result of strategic interactions within or between
households. Finally, the evidence indicates that the monthly nutrition cycle does not
result from households’ confusion about the value of their food stamps.
This paper makes several contributions. First, my ﬁndings constitute direct ﬁeld
evidence for short-run impatience. While quasi-hyperbolic discounting has been ap-
plied to a wide range of economic issues (see, e.g., Angeletos et al, 2001; Cutler,
Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003; Gruber and Koszegi, 2001; and O’Donohue and Rabin,
2001), evidence on short-run discounting has derived mainly from the laboratory
(Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donohue, 2002).1 Having reliable, real-world values
for short-run time preference parameters is essential to conducting simulations of
savings policy experiments (Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman, 1998).
Second, in showing that the timing of consumption is sensitive to the timing of
payments, these results constitute a rejection of the Permanent Income Hypothesis
(PIH). The rejection is especially striking given that households must solve the same
problem each month for a series of months. Although other research has argued that
the PIH is violated at monthly frequencies (Stephens, 2002 and 2003), such work has
tended to use data on expenditures, rather than actual consumption, to test the PIH.
The diﬀerence between food purchases and food intake may be especially important
at high frequencies, where the durability of purchases is more likely to be a concern.2
As the PIH has important implications for the evaluation of ﬁscal policy (Poterba,
1988), it is important to study whether existing rejections result from data deﬁciencies
of this sort.
1Exceptions include DellaVigna and Paserman (2001), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2002), and
Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2003), which infer hyperbolic preferences from job search behavior,
health club plan choice, and life cycle consumption and savings facts, respectively.
2Goods such as restaurant meals for which expenditure and consumption occur almost simulta-
neously raise the concern that food eaten in the home is a very close substitute for food eaten out
of the home. My data address total food intake, thus avoiding many of these issues.
3Finally, the food stamp program is of interest in its own right (Currie, 2003).
The economic literature on food stamps has investigated labor supply eﬀects (Fraker
and Moﬃtt, 1988) and the eﬀects of cash-out (Moﬃtt, 1989; Whitmore, 2002), and
has put relatively little emphasis on the timing of beneﬁtu s e . 3 My ﬁndings indicate
that the timing of payments may have important consequences for the welfare of
recipients. To the extent that my results tell us something about underlying time
preference parameters, these policy implications may generalize to other government
transfer programs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data on
caloric intake, as well as other supporting datasets used in the paper. Section 2
presents the basic evidence on the behavior of caloric intake over the month. Section
3 calibrates an exponential model of intertemporal choice and discusses evidence on
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Section 4 presents direct evidence on the
relationship between time preference and food intake, and shows results rejecting a
number of alternative hypotheses. Section 5 calibrates a quasi-hyperbolic model of the
allocation of the food budget, and discusses the consistency of the quasi-hyperbolic
model with the observed facts. Section 6 discusses policy implications. Section 7
concludes.
1D a t a
In a typical month in 2001, some 17 million Americans received food stamps, with
the average household getting roughly $160 per month in beneﬁts. This average
household had $620 in gross income and contained 2.3 individuals.4 Iw i l lm a k eu s e
of three datasets in my analysis, each appropriate for studying diﬀerent aspects of
3See Wilde and Ranney (1997, 2000) for notable recent exceptions.
4For a review of the characteristics of food stamp participants and participant households, see
U.S. Department of Agriculture (2002).
4the behavior of food stamp recipients.
The best available data on the consumption patterns of food stamp recipients
comes from the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals, 1989-91 (CSFII),
conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The CSFII is based on
a nationally representative sample of households, and collects three days of dietary
intake data for each household member. The ﬁrst day of data is collected by 24-hour
recall: the respondent is asked to list everything she ate on the previous day, with
interviewer prompts designed to help respondents ﬁll in frequently omitted items.
The second two days of data come from intake diaries completed by respondents over
the next 48 hours.5 USDA staﬀ process the data to produce aggregate measures of
nutrition, such as total daily caloric intake. Along with fairly rich demographic and
health data, the CSFII contains information on whether respondents are receiving
food stamps and, if so, the exact date of the last beneﬁt payment. From this variable
I construct a measure of the number of days since receipt of food stamps.6
For some purposes it will be convenient to know the market value as well as the
nutritional characteristics of food eaten. The Nationwide Food Consumption Survey
1987-88 (NFCS) contains detailed information on the quantity, price, and character-
istics of food used in the home over a seven-day period for a representative sample
of households. Participating households were contacted at the beginning of the di-
ary period and asked to keep a record of all foods used in the home over the next
seven days. This information was then collected by an interviewer at the end of the
seven-day period. For food eaten out of the home, total expenditure is recorded.7
5Enns, Goldman and Cook (1997) oﬀer further discussion of survey methodology and a descriptive
analysis of time trends in food consumption.
6Because the question about the date of last beneﬁtp a y m e n ti sa s k e do n l yo nt h eﬁrst survey
day, it is possible that a household at the beginning of its beneﬁt month could be coded as being at
the very end of its month. Since virtually no states vary the beneﬁt date systematically by month,
I correct for this problem by assuming that the day of the month of the next beneﬁt payment will
be the same as the day of the month of the previous beneﬁtp a y m e n t .
7See Huang and Lin (2000) for a further description of the dataset.
5I will also make some use of the Evaluation of the EBT Expansion in Maryland, a
survey conducted in 1992 and 1993 to document the eﬀects of Maryland’s statewide
adoption of the Electronic Beneﬁt Transfer (EBT) system.8 The survey was conducted
in two waves, the ﬁrst prior to the implementation of EBT, the second after its
implementation. It covers a random sample of 1,298 food stamp households residing
in Maryland. In addition to basic demographics, respondents were asked a variety
of questions about their use of food stamps, including a rich battery of questions on
the costs associated with using food stamps. Data from the second wave has been
matched with administrative records of all transactions debited to the beneﬁtc a r d
during an associated month. I will be using data from the pre-implementation wave
of the survey, as this corresponds more nearly with the time period of the CSFII.
The Appendix Table presents summary statistics for variables of interest from
these three datasets.
2 Monthly Patterns in Food Intake
Table 1 presents regressions of the log of total caloric intake on the number of days
since the household’s last receipt of food stamps using data from the CSFII. Since
this dataset contains at most 3 days of intake records per person, there is insuﬃcient
power to estimate this relationship with individual ﬁxed eﬀects. I therefore adopt the
identifying assumption that the diﬀerence between the interview date and the date
of last food stamp beneﬁt receipt is distributed randomly across households in the
sample. This allows me to recover the relationship between caloric intake and time
since receipt of food stamps using cross-sectional variation.
In all speciﬁcations I use dummy variables to control for the year, month, day of the
8See Wilde and Andrews (2000) for a further description of the data and an analysis of the use
of diﬀerent sources of income over the month.
6week, day of the calendar month, and day of the survey. All reported standard errors
have been adjusted for possible within-household correlation in the error structure.
In these and all subsequent regressions, I use the survey weights recommended by the
data providers to adjust for nonresponse.
Column (1) of Table 1 reports results with no demographic controls. Caloric intake
declines by a statistically signiﬁcant 0.45 percent per day after receipt of stamps.
Column (2) includes dummies for gender, race, ten-year age categories, and the log
of height in inches (with a dummy for missing data on height). Adding these controls
increases the ﬁt of the model considerably but has only a tiny eﬀect on the coeﬃcient
of interest, moving it to a 0.40 percent daily decline.
One potential problem with these estimates is that survey measures of energy in-
take are subject to severe underreporting (Livingstone and Black, 2003). If underre-
porting is additive—if each respondent reports true intake less a constant—speciﬁcations
using the log of caloric intake as the dependent variable will yield inconsistent esti-
mates of underlying parameters.
Column (3) of Table 1 therefore repeats the speciﬁcation reported in column (1)
using the level of caloric intake in place of the log of intake. The estimated daily
decline is strongly statistically signiﬁcant. When divided by the mean of caloric intake
of roughly 2500 kilocalories per day for the U.S. population in 1989 (USDA, 2000),
the estimate gives a daily decline of 0.32 percent.9 This result is quite similar to the
coeﬃcients reported in columns (1) and (2), suggesting that imperfect measurement
of caloric intake is not likely to be introducing signiﬁcant bias into my estimates.
Since the quality of food can vary quite independently of its quantity, it may
be inappropriate to use energy content as a summary measure of food intake. As
I show in section 3 of the Appendix, if food is a composite commodity produced
9Section 2 of the Appendix discusses formally the issues surrounding the functional form of
underreporting, and shows that in the case of additive measurement error these estimates of the
percentage daily decline will be consistent for the true slope parameter.
7from several inputs, then under suﬃcient regularity conditions the total market value
of food intake will at an optimum be proportional to the amount of the composite
commodity consumed.
The NFCS reports a household-level measure of the market value of food consumed
over a seven-day period. Column (4) presents results from a regression of the log of
this quantity on the number of days since receipt of food stamps as of the ﬁrst day of
t h es a m p l ep e r i o d . 10 This regression includes dummies for Census division, household
size, interview month, interview year, and day of the calendar month (at the beginning
of the sample period). Results are weighted as recommended by the data providers.
As column (4) shows, the decline in caloric intake is indeed indicative of a decline in
the overall value of food consumed. The percentage daily decline in food value of 0.73
is larger than that observed for caloric intake, reﬂecting substitution towards lower-
cost foods over the month. The fact that two datasets with completely independent
samples—the NFCS and CSFII—both reveal a statistically signiﬁcant decline in food
consumption over the month demonstrates the statistical reliability of the monthly
nutrition cycle.
3 Calibration of the Exponential Model
Towards a calibration of an exponential discounting model, consider a consumer who
maximizes utility over calories C given by
U =
T X
t=0
δ
tu(Ct) (1)
10Well-known survey fatigue eﬀects make it likely that the total value of food consumed reﬂects
food consumed at the beginning of the sample period more closely than food consumed at the end.
Using the number of days since receipt of food stamps averaged over the entire seven-day period
reduces statistical precision but gives qualitatively similar results.
8where u(•) is increasing and everywhere strictly concave and t i n d e x e sd a y si nam o n t h
of length T.11 Suppose that the consumer cannot borrow against future income and
is therefore given a ﬁxed stock W to spend over the month. Within the month, the
consumer faces a gross interest rate R, possibly less than unity, and a deterministic
stream of prices Pt, possibly constant. The budget constraint is therefore given by
W =
T X
t=0
PtCt
Rt . (2)
This model yields a standard Euler equation:
u
0 (Ct)=
Pt
Pt+1
δRu
0 (Ct+1). (3)
In the special case of isoelastic utility in which u0 (Ct)=C
−ρ
t for all t, equation (3)
c a nb ew r i t t e na s
∆ct+1 =
r − γ
ρ
−
∆pt+1
ρ
. (4)
Here, lowercase letters denote logs, ∆ denotes changes, and γ = −logδ.F r o m t h e
evidence in section 2, we know that ∆ct+1 is roughly −0.0040 for the average house-
hold. In order to translate this into an estimate of the daily discount rate γ,w em u s t
ﬁrst pin down values for r and ρ (assuming within-month variation in prices is zero
on average). While food stamps and food in the pantry do not accumulate interest, it
is possible that food depreciation could create a motive for early eating. I investigate
and reject this possibility in section 4.2, and therefore assume that r =0 .
It remains, then, to establish whether there exist reasonable values of both γ
and ρ that can ﬁt the facts. As equation (4) shows, ρ is equal to the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of demand for calories, sometimes called the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. A one percent increase in the price of calories tomorrow
relative to today will lead to an increase in relative caloric intake of 1
ρ percent.
11Note here that I am assuming perfect certainty. As Section 4 of the Appendix shows, this is a
conservative assumption, in that it will tend to bias any calibration toward a discount rate that is
too low.
9Suppose an annual discount factor of 0.8, which is well below recent estimates
based on the life cycle proﬁle of consumption, even for low-income groups.12 This
corresponds to a daily discount rate γ of about 0.0006. In order for this to be consis-
tent with my ﬁnding of a 0.40 percent daily decline in caloric intake, ρ would have to
be on the order of about 0.15, corresponding to an elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution of about 6.7. In other words, if the price of a calorie becomes 10 percent lower
on Tuesday relative to Monday, the caloric intake on Tuesday of a typical food stamp
recipient would have to increase by 67 percent relative to Monday. This would seem
to imply an enormous ability to substitute calories across days.
If we instead assume ρ =1 , which corresponds to log utility, the implied elasticities
seem far more sensible: a 10 percent decrease in relative prices will correspond to a 10
percent increase in relative intake. With this calibration, however, the daily discount
rate implied by my estimate of the drop in consumption over the month is about
0.0040. This corresponds to an annual discount factor of about 0.23,f a rb e l o ww h a t
would seem to be the reasonable range of values. (A person with a discount factor of
0.23 would accept 130 dollars of additional consumption today in exchange for 100
dollars of additional consumption every year forever.)
These simple calculations suggest that, given the observed decline in consumption
over the month, food stamp recipients must be either implausibly impatient in the
long run or extremely willing to substitute caloric intake across days. In the next
subsection I show direct evidence that high elasticities of intertemporal substitution
are not responsible for the monthly patterns in food intake.
12Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2003) calibrate the discount rate to the mid-life wealth-income
ratio and ﬁnd a discount factor of .91 for the least patient group (high school dropouts). Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) use the method of simulated moments to ﬁt a dynamic model of consumption to
the life-cycle proﬁle and ﬁnd discount factors consistently above .93 for several occupation/education
categories.
103.1 Highly Elastic Intertemporal Substitution
Inferring time preference from a declining consumption path relies crucially on the
assumption of diminishing marginal utility from food. If calories today are very good
substitutes for calories tomorrow, then even a tiny amount of time preference could
lead to rapidly diminishing food intake over the month.13
Similarly, if households’ preferences are non-convex over certain regions, then stan-
dard models of intertemporal choice may lead to false conclusions about preference
parameters. In particular, suppose that households like to have a few feast days each
month and a number of days with relatively less intake, rather than having the same
amount of intake on all days. In this case, even slightly impatient households might
well have all of their feasts at the beginning of the month, since the cost of feasting
is presumably constant over the month. This type of model could therefore produce
a steep decline in caloric intake over the month without unusually present-biased
preferences.
Models of this kind can produce declining total utility over the month. However,
even if there are regions over which marginal utility is non-diminishing, an optimizing
agent will generally consume in a region of diminishing marginal utility (Becker, 1971).
Moreover, if such an agent is patient in the short run, her marginal utility will not
rise over the month—otherwise there would be an opportunity to increase total utility
at the margin by reallocating consumption towards later days.
The central prediction of these models is therefore that the marginal utility of
food (or the marginal utility of money to buy food) does not rise signiﬁcantly over the
month, even though the amount of food eaten declines. Evidence of rising marginal
13To illustrate, consider the extreme case of linear utility, which corresponds to inﬁnitely elastic
intertemporal substitution (or ρ =0 ). With no impatience, the agent will be indiﬀerent between
consuming 2000 calories today and 2000 calories tomorrow, or 4000 calories today and zero calories
tomorrow. However, any arbitrarily small amount of impatience will lead the agent to strictly prefer
4000 calories today and zero calories tomorrow over any other allocation with the same total number
of calories.
11utility over the month would reject the models discussed above and provide additional
support for a model based on time preference.
Respondents to the Maryland EBT survey were asked the following question:
S u p p o s ey o uh a dac h o i c eb e t w e e ng e t t i n g$ 5 0i nc a s ho n em o n t hf r o m
today, or getting less than $50 today. Would you take less than $50 to
get the money today?
The 20 percent of respondents who answered aﬃrmatively were then asked:
What is the smallest amount of cash you would take today rather than
getting the $50 one month from today?
The mean imputed monthly “discount factor” for the sample of respondents is
0.93. While the usual caveats about hypothetical choice data apply (Wallis and
Friedman, 1942), the answer to this question will likely capture both time preference
and the extent of the household’s need for cash. Respondents who are impatient, or
who ﬁnd themselves in diﬃcult ﬁnancial circumstances, are likely to reply that they
would accept less than $50 today in exchange for $50 in a month. Since the time
preference component is presumably stable over the month, any relationship between
the preferences expressed in response to this question and the number of days since
receipt of food stamps would strongly suggest changes in the marginal utility of money
over the month.
As Table 2 illustrates, the data reveal a striking monthly cycle in households’
willingness to accept a smaller immediate payment in exchange for a larger future
payment. Column (1) shows the results of a probit regression in which the dependent
variable is a dummy for whether the household would accept less than 50 dollars
today in exchange for 50 dollars in four weeks. The estimates indicate that the
share of households willing to make this trade increases by 0.35 percentage points per
12day. Column (2) adds additional demographic controls, including dummies for age
categories, gender, race, and whether the respondent is a high school graduate, leaving
the results essentially unchanged. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the speciﬁcations of
columns (1) and (2), using as a dependent variable the log of the “discount rate”
implied by the respondent’s reply to the hypothetical choice question. The results
indicate that this “discount rate” increases by 0.24 percent per day over the course
of the food stamp month.
These ﬁndings show that food stamp households ﬁnd themselves in increasingly
dire straits as the food stamp month progresses. This fact contrasts sharply with a
model in which a calorie today is just as good as a calorie tomorrow. It is also diﬃcult
to reconcile with explanations based on rotting food or other forms of depreciation. It
is, however, quite consistent with an explanation based on time preference: impatient
consumers will allow their marginal utility of consumption to increase over the month,
because they are unwilling to sacriﬁce eating today in order to prevent a shortage
tomorrow.
4R o b u s t n e s s
Both the magnitude of the decline in caloric intake and the pattern of rising household
n e e df o rc a s ho v e rt h em o n t hm a k eﬁtting an exponential model to the data extremely
diﬃcult within the reasonable range of parameter values. In this section I will argue
using both direct evidence on time preference and indirect evidence on alternative
models that the food stamp nutrition cycle is due to short-run impatience.
4.1 Direct Evidence on the Role of Time Preference
The most direct test of the role of time preference would be to estimate the eﬀect
of cross-sectional diﬀerences in the discount rate on the magnitude of the monthly
13decline in caloric intake. Unfortunately, the CSFII and NFCS do not contain any direct
measures of time preference. I therefore take an alternative approach, which is to use
evidence from the Maryland EBT survey’s hypothetical choice between receiving 50
dollars in four weeks or less than 50 dollars today. This survey question, discussed in
greater detail in section 3.1, provides a useful estimate (or at least a correlate) of the
true rate of time preference.
The Maryland EBT survey data do not contain information on caloric intake.
However, the survey does contain some questions related to the variability of spending
and food availability over the month, making it possible to ask whether more patient
individuals smooth more eﬀectively. For example, respondents were asked
In [the previous calendar month], did anyone in your household skip
any meals because there wasn’t enough food, money, or food stamps to
buy food?
Nine percent of respondents answered “yes” to this question. Column (1) of Table
3 shows the results of a probit regression of the answer to this “food insuﬃciency”
question on a dummy variable for whether the respondent would accept less than
$50 today in exchange for $50 in one month. Individuals who would accept less
than $50 today are seven percent more likely to report having run out of food in the
previous month. As column (2) shows, this ﬁnding is robust to the inclusion of a
set of demographic controls, including dummies for age categories, gender, race, and
whether the respondent is a high school graduate.14
Though suggestive of an eﬀect of time preference on households’ ability to smooth
food consumption, these regressions raise concerns of reverse causality. Households
that are having a bad month—in the sense that they have run out of food—may be more
14Very similar results can be obtained using a number of alternative dependent variables, including
the number of days in the previous month on which the respondent worried about having enough
food.
14willing to accept less than $50 today in exchange for $50 in one month. Although the
food insuﬃciency question asks about the previous month, households that experi-
enced food insuﬃciency last month are presumably more likely to be experiencing it
now. Food insuﬃciency might therefore be causing high estimated impatience, rather
than impatience causing food insuﬃciency.
To address this issue, columns (3) and (4) re-estimate the speciﬁcations of columns
(1) and (2) controlling for the amount of food stamps remaining out of the household’s
most recent allotment. The coeﬃcients on the impatience dummy do fall slightly, but
they remain statistically and economically signiﬁcant.
Overall, then, the evidence indicates that time preference plays an important role
in households’ smoothing of food consumption over the month. However, there are
alternative models that could potentially explain the monthly pattern in nutritional
intake. In the next subsections I evaluate several of these models and ﬁnd that none
is consistent with the available data.
4.2 Shopping and Depreciation
Possibly the simplest explanation for the consumption decline is that food rots. Sup-
pose that a household were to do most of its major grocery shopping on the day on
which it receives food stamp beneﬁts. If stored food loses some percent of its value
for each day it goes uneaten, then even a perfectly patient household would display
a consumption decline over the month.
The CSFII data contains a survey question on shopping frequency. Respondents
were asked how often someone does a major shopping for the household, and were
able to answer either more than once a week, once a week, once every two weeks, once
a month or less, or never. Table 4 repeats the baseline speciﬁcation of Table 1 on four
15shopping frequency categories.15 If anything, the evidence suggests that households
with frequent shopping have more of a decline in consumption than households with
infrequent shopping.
The variation in consumption patterns across shopping frequencies could certainly
be due to other diﬀerences between households. Nevertheless, the results in Table
4 show that even households shopping on average once or more each week display
as i g n i ﬁcant decline in caloric intake over the month. Evidently, the food stamp
nutrition cycle is not caused by infrequent shopping and food depreciation.
4.3 Strategic Motives
If individuals can extract resources from one another, either through transfers or
through outright theft, then food stamp participants may eﬀectively face negative
interest rates. The more wealth I consume today, the less will be available tomorrow
to be stolen or transferred to others, and the more I can credibly demand from those
who care about me in order to prevent my own starvation.16
The most straightforward eﬀect in this class of models is direct theft. If each dollar
of wealth carries with it a per-period probability of theft, this hazard rate will tend
to make a declining consumption proﬁle optimal. Respondents to the Maryland EBT
survey were asked whether any food stamps were lost or stolen in the previous two
months, and if so for the unrecovered amount.17 Using information on the amount of
food stamp beneﬁts received, I have converted this amount into a daily rate of loss.
The median daily amount of loss and theft is 0, and the average is 0.0001. This ﬁgure
is far too small to contribute signiﬁcantly to the observed consumption decline.
15Households that report never doing a major shopping trip are omitted from the analysis.
16This is similar to Becker’s (1998) observation that we may sometimes prefer to cross the street
in order to avoid feeling obligated to donate to a beggar.
17Since some of food stamp recipients’ wealth is held as food rather than food stamps, it would be
desirable to know the rate of theft or loss of food. Unfortunately, this information is not available,
although the probability of theft of food would have to be quite considerable to alter my conclusions.
16A scramble for resources within the household could potentially generate a downward-
sloping consumption path. In such a model, when beneﬁts arrive, each household
member tries to eat what she can to capture as much of the available resources as
possible. One simple test of the importance of this theory is to compare single-person
households to households with multiple individuals. Only 8 percent of the observa-
tions in the CSFII are from individuals in single-person households, making precise
comparisons diﬃcult, but it is still possible to ask whether the results are driven by
large households.
Table 5 addresses this issue. Column (1) presents the baseline speciﬁcation of Ta-
ble 1, interacting the number of days since receipt of food stamps with the number of
individuals in the household (top-coded at 6). While individuals in larger households
do appear to experience a larger decline in consumption, the diﬀerence is statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant and quantitatively quite small. Adding an additional household
member increases the rate of consumption decline by .02 percent. And as column
(2) shows, for respondents in single-person households the daily decline in caloric
intake is quantitatively similar to that estimated for the average respondent in Table
1 .T h o u g ht h ee s t i m a t ei sq u i t ei m p r e c i s e ,i td o e sn o ti n d i c a t ea ni m p o r t a n tr o l ef o r
within-household competition in determining the time path of consumption.
An alternative approach to examining consumption behavior directly is to ask
whether, in the Maryland EBT survey, individuals living in larger households tend
to report skipping meals more often than respondents in multi-person households.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 address this question in a probit framework. Column
(3) presents a univariate analysis of the relationship between household size and
self-reported food insuﬃciency. There is no appreciable eﬀect, and if anything the
estimates suggest that individuals living in smaller households are more likely to
have run out of food in the past month. Column (4) adds demographic controls to
17the model; the coeﬃcient on household size is now positive but extremely small.18
Even if within-household competition is not an important factor, transfers of re-
sources between households may, play a role. If I know that the less money I save
the less I will be expected to contribute to others, and the more I will be able to
credibly demand from friends, my consumption may decline over the month even if I
am perfectly patient.
Measuring the magnitude of this eﬀect is diﬃcult even with perfect data, because
in a completely symmetric world no transfers will actually take place. Fortunately
there is considerable heterogeneity in reality: not all members of the relevant com-
munity will necessarily be on food stamps, and in many states those who are receive
their beneﬁts at very diﬀerent dates.
In particular, the transfers model predicts that food stamp recipients will be net
donors of food (or other resources) earlier in their food stamp month (when their
wealth exceeds the community average) and net recipients later on. These implica-
tions are testable, since the CSFII records whether a respondent’s meal is eaten at
another person’s home.
Table 6 explores the relationship between time of month and eating in the home
of friends or relatives. As column (1) shows, there is no correlation between the
probability of eating at another person’s home and the number of days since receipt
of food stamps. This is not simply a matter of lack of statistical precision: the
probit model can reject positive eﬀects as small as 0.07 percent per day. In column
(2), I examine the relationship between the probability of eating in another person’s
home and whether the respondent indicates being short on cash on the survey date.
T h e r ei sn oe v i d e n c et h a tf o o de a t e no u to ft h eh o m eb u ﬀe r ss h o c k se x p e r i e n c e db y
the household. Column (3) uses the number of calories obtained in others’ homes
18Results are similar using a dummy variable for single-person households rather than a continuous
measure of household size.
18as the dependent variable. Although the amount of food transferred increases over
the month, the eﬀect is tiny and statistically insigniﬁcant. Column (4) repeats this
speciﬁcation using a dummy for whether the respondent was short on cash as the
independent variable and suggests the same conclusion.
O nt h ew h o l e ,t h e n ,t h ed a t ar e j e c te x p l a n a t i o n sf o rt h ed e c l i n eb a s e do ns t r a t e g i c
considerations. While these concerns may be present, they are not quantitatively
strong enough to show up in the data, and therefore seem unlikely to be the driving
force behind the food stamp nutrition cycle.
4.4 Confusion about the Value of Food Stamps
Liebman and Zeckhauser (2003) have recently suggested that recipients are confused
about the value of their food stamps. A household that must supplement its food
stamps with cash may think early in the month that food stamps are worth less than
their face value equivalent in cash, leading the household to overconsume food early
on in the month. Later, when food is being purchased with cash, the household will
correctly value the food and will consume less. As a test of this hypothesis, which
Liebman and Zeckhauser have colorfully dubbed “Schmeduling,” I have compared
households for whom food stamps cover all household food expenditures to households
that spend more on food than they receive in food stamps. The results indicate a small
and statistically insigniﬁcant reduction in the monthly nutrition cycle for households
that use only food stamps for food (regression not shown). It does not seem that
confusion can account for the monthly decline in caloric intake.
5 Calibration of the Quasi-hyperbolic Model
Having shown that the weight of the evidence strongly supports a time preference-
based explanation of my ﬁndings, it remains to compare the exponential and quasi-
19hyperbolic discounting models in terms of their ability to replicate the observed con-
sumption patterns. In section 3 I argued that it is not possible to construct a sensible
calibration of a standard exponential discounting model to explain my quantitative
results. In this section I present and calibrate a quasi-hyperbolic model of intertem-
poral choice that is consistent both with survey evidence on the time preferences of
food stamp recipients and with the existing literature on non-exponential discounting.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting posits that an individual at time t discounts utility
from a future period t+ j by the factor βδ
j. In other words, tomorrow’s utility is βδ
less important than today’s utility, and utility two days from now is δ less important
than utility tomorrow. With a high δ and a low β, an agent will be simultaneously
patient over long-term choices and impatient over short-term ones. With β =1hy-
perbolic discounting reduces to standard exponential discounting.
To ﬁx ideas, consider our T-period consumption problem in which we abstract
away from uncertainty, interest, and variation in prices. As before, let utility be
isoelastic with parameter ρ. Then the hyperbolic Euler equation (Harris and Laibson,
forthcoming) at time t is given by:
C
−ρ
t =[ C
0 (Wt+1)βδ +( 1− C
0 (Wt+1))δ]C
−ρ
t+1 (5)
where C (•) is the consumption function. Since the model incorporates conﬂicts be-
tween the present self and the future self, the lower is the tomorrow self’s marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth, the more this condition will approach the stan-
dard exponential Euler equation.
In the isoelastic case, consumption is proportional to wealth, so we can write
C (Wt)=αtWt (6)
where αT =1and
20αt =
αt+1
αt+1 +( δ(1 − (1 − β)αt+1))
1
ρ
(7)
for t<T . This provides a simple recursive method for solving the equilibrium
consumption path.19
It is now possible to ask whether sensible values of quasi-hyperbolic preference
parameters can ﬁt the observed decline in caloric intake. For parsimony, I will as-
sume throughout that δ =1 , which is likely to be a very good approximation at daily
frequencies. Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003) estimate the annual time pref-
erence parameters of a hyperbolic discounter solving a life cycle consumption problem
and ﬁnd β = .7 for their benchmark model. In order for this estimate to be consistent
with the decline in caloric intake, we will need ρ =3 .4. This implies that a 10 per-
cent reduction in relative prices causes a 2.9 p e r c e n ti n c r e a s ei nr e l a t i v ec o n s u m p t i o n ,
which does not seem unreasonable.
If we assume log utility, then the quasi-hyperbolic model can ﬁt the consumption
decline with a β of 0.91. This is within the range suggested by experimental evidence
(Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002), and is at the high end of the range
of estimates reported by Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2003). It is also very
similar to the average monthly discount factor of 0.93 imputed from the hypothetical
choice evidence discussed in section 3.
It is thus possible to replicate the key features of the food stamp nutrition cycle
using a parametrization consistent with life cycle facts, survey evidence and experi-
mental results on quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
19See section 5 of the Appendix for a proof that this is the solution.
216 Policy Implications
In the quasi-hyperbolic model, the equilibrium consumption path is suboptimal in
the sense that the consumer would be willing to pay for a commitment technology
that would force her not to over-consume in early periods. This begs the question of
whether there might be a policy tool for reducing the monthly consumption decline.
Since the introduction of EBT, which drastically reduced the cost of delivering ben-
eﬁts, some have suggested increasing the frequency of payments (Wilde and Ranney,
2000).
This is not an unrealistic proposal: In New York State, Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) beneﬁts are already paid out twice each month. And in a
focus group conducted in 1990 some participants suggested breaking beneﬁts down
into smaller amounts delivered more frequently (Ohls, Fraker, Martini and Ponza,
1992):
“Break it [beneﬁt check] down with a check on the 1st and a check
on the 15th like they used to do [for AFDC]. If you’re spending most
of your money in the ﬁr s tf e wd a y so ft h em o n t hw i t ho n ec h e c k ,i fy o u
spend most of it on the 1st, you know [with two checks] you got that other
money coming through so you’re stringing it out.”
“Give it to us in two installments. At the end of the month I’m dying
[for money]. If you got it on the 1st and 15th, or whatever, it would be so
much better. Checks or coupons, it doesn’t matter, either way, but it does
not last a month. The second part of the month is always a struggle.”
It is important to note, however, that the magnitude of the realized welfare loss
depends crucially on assumptions about the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
For the case of log utility (ρ =1 ), a consumer whose “true” optimal consumption path
22is constant over the month but whose actual consumption declines by 0.4 percent per
day suﬀers losses equivalent to 0.06 percent of her total monthly food expenditures,
or about 15 cents per month for the typical food stamp household.20 For ρ =3 .4,
the case consistent with Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman’s (2003) preferred estimate
of β, the losses are only 0.2 percent of monthly expenditures, or about 50 cents per
household per month. On the other hand, if the marginal utility from food is very
rapidly diminishing, say with ρ =4 0 , then the losses are more substantial: 2.1 percent
of monthly food outlays or 5.25 dollars per month.
These potential gains must be evaluated against the increased administrative and
other costs associated with more frequent beneﬁt distribution. While obtaining a pre-
cise estimate of these costs is beyond the scope of this paper, some rough calculations
are possible. In Maryland in 1993, after the introduction of EBT, total food stamp
program costs per case month were about $3.85 in contemporaneous dollars (Logan et
al, 1994). If an increase in payment frequency were to raise costs by, say, ﬁve percent,
we would need a ρ of approximately 1.3 to justify the policy change, assuming that
an increase in payment frequency could completely eliminate the consumption cycle.
These calculations suggest the need for further evidence on the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution. If consumers are relatively happy to substitute calories
across time periods, the welfare losses may not be large enough to justify an interven-
tion. This would be consistent with Cochrane’s (1989) observation that the welfare
eﬀects of deviations from the optimal consumption path tend to be small in practice.
Alternatively, if consumers are unwilling to substitute food consumption across days,
the potential for gains is large.
20These calculations assume that a typical food stamp household spends $250 monthly on food,
roughly the median of reported spending in the CSFII. See Appendix 6 for the formal model under-
lying the welfare calculations.
237C o n c l u s i o n s
The evidence presented in this paper challenges the PIH, and exponential discounting
more generally, as descriptions of the intertemporal choices of food stamp households.
In contrast, the quasi-hyperbolic model is consistent with my ﬁndings, and has po-
tentially very diﬀerent implications for the expected impact of ﬁscal policy and the
optimal timing of beneﬁt payments. Whether my results generalize to other popula-
tions is an important topic for future research. Data on nutritional intake of the sort I
have employed here are likely to be an important tool for future studies, because they
allow direct observation of consumption at the daily level. Such a high level of detail
is especially important for testing theories, such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, that
focus on trade-oﬀsm a d eo v e rt h ev e r ys h o r tr u n .
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28Table 1: Monthly Patterns in Food Intake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable log(caloric intake) caloric intake log(food value)
Days since receipt -0.0045 -0.0040 -7.9439 -0.0073
of food stamps (0.0021) (0.0019) (3.1772) (0.0038)
Demographics? No Yes No Yes
Dataset CSFII CSFII CSFII NFCS
Number of observations 6652 6652 6652 309
R2 0.0796 0.1895 0.0966 0.6013
Notes:
In regressions using the CSFII, each observation describes one household member on
one survey day (out of three total days). In regressions using the NFCS, each observation
describes one household on one week. Regressions (1) to (3) include dummies for survey
day, day of week, year, month, and calendar date. Regression (2) includes dummies for
gender, race, ten-year age categories, and the log of height in inches (with a dummy for
missing data on height). Regression (4) includes dummies for Census division, household
size, interview month, interview year, and day of the calendar month (at the beginning of
the sample period). In regressions (1) to (3), standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for
intercorrelation within households. Survey weights used as recommended by data providers.
29Table 2: Monthly Patterns in the Need for Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Pr(would accept log(willingness
less than $50) to accept)
Days since receipt 0.0035 0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0024
of food stamps (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Demographics? No Yes No Yes
Model Probit Probit OLS OLS
Number of observations 1100 1100 1100 1100
(Pseudo-)R2 0.0058 0.0178 0.0040 0.0132
Notes:
Data from Maryland EBT study. Each observation describes one respondent. Probit
coeﬃcients reported as marginal eﬀects. Demographic controls include dummies for ten-year
age categories, sex, race, and high school graduation status of household head. Dummies
for missing data are included for all controls.
30T a b l e3 :T i m eP r e f e r e n c ea n dF o o dI n s u ﬃciency
Dependent variable: Pr(skipped a meal last month)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Would accept less than $50 today 0.0655 0.0578 0.0616 0.0522
in exchange for $50 in four weeks (0.0249) (0.0236) (0.0244) (0.0230)
Amount of food stamps -0.0371 -0.0389
currently remaining ($100) (0.0155) (0.0149)
Demographics? No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 1106 1106 1100 1100
Pseudo-R2 0.0128 0.0346 0.0224 0.0456
Notes:
Data from Maryland EBT study. Each observation describes one respondent. Coeﬃ-
cients are marginal eﬀects from a probit regression. Demographic controls include dummies
for ten-year age categories, sex, race, and high school graduation status of household head.
Dummies for missing data are included for all controls.
31Table 4: Shopping Frequency and Caloric Intake
Dependent variable: log(caloric intake)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shopping frequency More than Once a Once every Once a month
once a week week two weeks or less
Days since receipt -0.0104 -0.0087 0.0021 -0.0029
of food stamps (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0031)
Number of observations 655 1394 1895 2687
R2 0.2496 0.2374 0.1135 0.1130
Notes:
Data from CSFII. Each observation describes one household member on one survey day
(out of three total days). Regressions include dummies for survey day, day of week, year,
month, and calendar date. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for intercorrelation
within households. Survey weights used as recommended by data providers.
32Table 5: The Eﬀect of Household Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable log(caloric intake) Pr(skipped a meal)
Days since receipt × -0.0002
household size (0.0013)
Days since receipt -0.0034 -0.0037
of food stamps (0.0048) (0.0046)
Household size 0.0183 -0.0087 0.0017
(0.0228) (0.0060) (0.0081)
Demographics? No No No Yes
Sample All Single-person All All
household
Model OLS OLS Probit Probit
Dataset CSFII CSFII EBT EBT
Number of observations 6652 519 1106 1103
(Pseudo-)R2 0.0814 0.3523 0.0032 0.0442
Notes:
In regressions using the CSFII, each observation describes one household member on
one survey day (out of three total days). In regressions using EBT data, each observation
describes one respondent. Regressions (1) and (2) include dummies for survey day, day
of week, year, month, and calendar date. In regressions (1) and (2), standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted for intercorrelation within households. Demographic controls in
column (4) include dummies for ten-year age categories, sex, race, and high school gradu-
ation status of household head, as well as total value of food stamps received in previous
month. Dummies for missing data are included for all controls. Probit coeﬃcients reported
as marginal eﬀects. Survey weights used as recommended by data providers.
33Table 6: Inter-household Transfers Over the Month
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Pr(Ate in other home) Calories received
Days since receipt 0.0001 0.4753
of food stamps (0.0003) (0.4072)
Short on cash -0.0066 -0.8644
(0.0150) (16.9869)
Model Probit Probit OLS OLS
No. of observations 6671 6683 6671 6683
(Pseudo-)R2 0.1014 0.1017 0.0266 0.0273
Notes:
Data from CSFII. Each observation describes one household member on one survey
day (out of three total days). All speciﬁcations include dummies for survey day, day of
week, year, month, and calendar date. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for
intercorrelation within households. Probit coeﬃcients reported as marginal eﬀects. Survey
weights used as recommended by data providers.
348 Appendix
8.1 Summary Statistics
Appendix Table
P a n e lA :C S F I I
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Energy (kcal) 6652 1638 813 24 10413
Age (years) 6652 24.8 21.9 0 91
Household size 6652 4.07 1.98 1 18
NP e r c e n t
Male 6652 37.1
White 6652 51.2
Panel B: NFCS
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Food value ($) 309 61.4 38.9 .6 201.1
Household size 309 3.23 1.86 1 10
P a n e lC :E B T
N Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
Age 1095 38.6 1.5 18 93
Household size 1103 2.59 1.49 1 11
Amount of food stamps ($) 1103 183 111 0 760
NP e r c e n t
Male 1103 17.0
White 1103 33.3
High school graduate 1103 46.9
35Notes:
Survey weights used as recommended by data providers. In CSFII data, characteristics
refer to respondent. In Maryland EBT study, characteristics refer to household head.
8.2 Measurement Error and Functional Form
Consider a sample of individuals i with true caloric intake C∗
i .L e tt h et r u em o d e lo f
c a l o r i ci n t a k eb eg i v e nb y
c
∗
i = α − βDi + εi
where c∗
i ≡ logC∗
i , Di is the number of days since receipt of food stamps, and εi is
an i.i.d. error term orthogonal to Di.L e t Ci denote the reported caloric intake of
individual i. We consider two cases.
Case 1 Multiplicative measurement error.
Suppose that reported intake Ci is related to true intake C∗
i by
Ci = ΦiC
∗
i
with logΦi orthogonal to Di. Letting φi ≡ logΦi and ci ≡ logCi,w ec a nw r i t e
ci = α − βDi + εi + φi.
An OLS regression of ci on Di will therefore yield a consistent estimate for β.( N o t e ,
however, that if φi does not have mean 0 the resulting estimate of α will be biased.)
Case 2 Additive measurement error.
Now let reported intake be given by
Ci = C
∗
i + ψi
where ψi is orthogonal to Di. Then, by a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion around C∗
i ,w e
can write
ci =l o g ( C
∗
i + ψi)
≈ logC
∗
i +
ψi
C∗
i
≈ α − βDi + εi +
ψi
C∗
i
.
Since
ψi
C∗
i will not be orthogonal to Di, an OLS regression of ci on Di will not yield
a consistent estimate of β.I n p a r t i c u l a r , s i n c e
ψi
C∗
i will tend to be larger when C∗
i
36is smaller (and therefore when Di is larger), OLS estimates will be biased upward
relative to the true parameter β.
Using the level rather than the log of reported calories as the dependent variable
gives
Ci = C
∗
i + ψi
=e x p ( α − βDi + εi)+ψi
≈ exp(α) − exp(α)βDi +e x p( α)εi + ψi.
Since ψi is orthogonal to Di, an OLS regression of Ci on Di will provide a consistent
estimate of exp(α)β. Scaling the OLS coeﬃcient by an estimate of the true mean of
caloric intake will give a consistent estimate of the slope parameter β.
8.3 Market Value and Food Quality
Let the instantaneous utility from food consumption in period t be given by u(Ft),
where Ft is food consumption. Suppose further that Ft is produced from inputs
X1,...,X n a c c o r d i n gt ot h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o nF (•), which I will assume has con-
stant returns to scale. The inputs have market prices p1,...,pn, respectively.
T h ec o n s u m e r ’ sc h o i c eo ff o o d sX must satisfy the cost minimization program
min
X1,...,Xn
n X
i=1
piXi
s.t. Ft = F (X1,...,Xn)
The ﬁrst-order condition of this problem is that
pi = µFi
for all i,w h e r eµ is the shadow price of a marginal unit of food (which is a constant
due to the assumption of CRS). Multiplying both sides by Xi and summing, we have
that
n X
i=1
piXi = µ
n X
i=1
FiXi.
By Euler’s Theorem we can rewrite this expression as
n X
i=1
piXi = µFt.
Thus, the market value of food consumed is proportional to the composite good Ft
that enters the instantaneous utility function u(•).
378.4 Uncertainty in the Exponential Model21
Adopting the model in section 5.1, let us add the possibility of some uncertainty in
caloric intake. Then for any day t in the interior of the food stamp month intake Ct
must satisfy
C
−ρ
t = δREt
£
C
−ρ
t+1
¤
.
Taking the well-known second-order approximation to this condition gives
Et [∆ct+1]=
r − γ
ρ
+
ρ
2
Va r t [∆ct+1].
Solving for the discount rate γ gives
γ = r − ρEt [∆ct+1]+
ρ2
2
Va r t [∆ct+1].
Since the second term in this expression must be weakly greater than zero, we can
write
γ ≥ r − ρEt [∆ct+1].
So, we can estimate a lower bound of the daily discount rate necessary to explain the
observed behavior of food stamp recipients as the product of the curvature parameter
ρ and the average daily decline in food consumption, plus the interest rate r. Ignoring
uncertainty will only lead to an underestimate of the true discount rate.
8.5 Equilibrium in the Quasi-hyperbolic Model
We wish to prove that consumption is proportional to wealth in the quasi-hyperbolic
model set out in section 5.2.22 The initial condition is obvious: CT = WT by the
budget constraint. Now suppose that Ct+1 = αt+1Wt+1 for some time period t +1 .
By the generalized Euler equation (5) we know that
C
−ρ
t =[ αt+1βδ +( 1− αt+1)δ](αt+1Wt+1)
−ρ .
Note that, from the budget condition, Wt+1 = Wt −Ct. Substituting in this relation-
ship gives
C
−ρ
t =[ αt+1βδ+( 1− αt+1)δ](αt+1 (Wt − Ct))
−ρ .
Rearranging terms, one can show that
Ct =
αt+1
αt+1 +( δ (1 − (1 − β)αt+1))
1
ρ
Wt.
21I am grateful to David Laibson for pointing out the argument in this section.
22See Laibson (1996) for a more complete derivation of this and other properties of the equilibrium
consumption path under quasi-hyperbolic discounting and isoelastic utility.
38By induction, then, we have that
Ct = αtWt
for all t,w i t hαT =1and
αt =
αt+1
αt+1 +( δ(1 − (1 − β)αt+1))
1
ρ
as desired.
8.6 Calculating the Welfare Costs of the Nutrition Cycle
For expositional purposes it will be helpful to consider welfare implications in contin-
uous time, although the results are not sensitive to this modeling choice. Consider
a household with a discount rate of 0 that faces a net interest rate of 0 and an
instantaneous utility of consumption given by
u(t)=
C (t)
1−ρ
1 − ρ
.
The household’s optimal consumption path is is therefore constant on the interval
[0,T]. Suppose, however, that given wealth W to spend over this interval the true
consumption path is given by
C (t)=e x p( θ − υt)
where υ is an exogenous slope parameter arising due to non-exponential discounting
(or some other form of mistake). Then θ is determined by the budget condition
Z T
0
exp(θ − υt)dt = W
which implies that
exp(θ)=
υW
1 − exp(−υT).
We would like to know what share (1 − λ) of its wealth the household would be
willing to sacriﬁce in order to achieve a constant consumption proﬁle. In other words,
we would like to ﬁnd λ to solve the following equation:
Z T
0
(exp(θ − υt))
1−ρ
1 − ρ
dt =
Z T
0
¡
λW
T
¢1−ρ
1 − ρ
dt.
39We can simplify this expression to
1
1 − ρ
µ
υ
1 − exp(−υT)
¶1−ρ 1
υ(1 − ρ)
(1 − exp(−υ(1 − ρ)T)) =
1
1 − ρ
µ
λ
T
¶1−ρ
T.
Note that the welfare loss is independent of wealth W. We can rewrite this expression
as
λ =
"
1
1 − ρ
µ
υ
1 − exp(−υT)
¶1−ρ 1
υ(1 − ρ)
(1 − exp(−υ(1 − ρ)T))(1 − ρ)T
−ρ
# 1
1−ρ
.
Values for welfare losses reported in section 6 are obtained by evaluating this
expression for T =3 0 , υ =0 .0040, and alternative values for ρ.
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